

### Online Appendix 1: Coding Transitions and Breakdowns

Coding transitions to democracy and democratic breakdowns based on an underlying continuous variable inevitably involves drawing somewhat arbitrary cut points. Although the level of democracy is a continuous variable, we agree with Lührmann et al. (and many other scholars, and Freedom House) that for some research purposes, it is useful to establish categorical regime types. Otherwise, it would be impossible to trace outcomes of democratic transitions because there would be no way of establishing when a democracy had begun.

Lührmann et al. code any change from an electoral-democracy score below .50 to one of .50 or greater as a transition to electoral democracy. Any change from a score of .50 or more to a score of .49 or lower counts as a breakdown. These rules generate some transitions that are shortly followed by breakdowns, and some breakdowns that are shortly followed by transitions, based on very minor changes. To avoid having minor short-lived increases to and drops below this .50 threshold count as two or more regime changes, we used Lührmann et al.’s more elaborate 10-type scale, which adds categories that lie at the borders between the four basic regime types. We concentrate on their *Electoral Autocracy, upper bound* and *Electoral Democracy, lower bound* to minimize this problem. An Electoral Autocracy, upper bound is a regime whose point estimates place it on the authoritarian side of the threshold, but whose classification crosses into the democratic side once V-Dem’s measurement model credibility intervals are taken in consideration. Conversely, an Electoral Democracy, lower bound is a regime whose point estimates place it on the democratic side but which crosses the threshold to autocracy once credibility intervals are taken in consideration. In these cases, the line dividing autocracies from democracies is blurred.

For our purposes, transitions and breakdowns will be over-counted if we include every short-lived and minor change above and below the .50 threshold as a regime change. If a country shifted to a lower bound electoral democracy but subsequently reverted back to an autocracy, we always treated this as a transition and breakdown if the country was coded as a lower bound electoral democracy for more than three years. If the number of years in which the country is coded as an Electoral Democracy, lower bound during this period was two or three, we code it as a transition followed by breakdown only if the length of the democratic period is equal to or greater than the subsequent number of years of autocracy. If the number of years in which the country is coded as an Electoral Democracy, lower bound was one, we coded it as a transition only if the subsequent authoritarianism lasted only one year and it was followed by a new democratic regime that lasted at least two years.

Likewise, if a country’s electoral-democracy score slipped slightly below .50 but rebounded to .50 or higher in short order, we always treated this as a breakdown and subsequent transition if the number of years in which the country was coded as autocratic was greater than three. If a country is coded as an Electoral Autocracy, upper bound during this period for two or three years, we code it as a breakdown followed by transition if the length of the autocratic period was greater than the subsequent number of years of democracy. If the number of years in which the country is coded as an Electoral Autocracy, upper bound during this period was one, we coded it as a breakdown if the subsequent democracy lasted only one year and it was followed by a new authoritarian regime that lasted for a minimum of two years.

## Online Appendix 2: Details of Coding Regime Outcomes

To measure an erosion or a democratic advance, we took advantage of the fact that V-Dem estimates of regime characteristics are accompanied by an estimate of uncertainty, a unique feature of the project. V-Dem’s measurement model produces a distribution of possible values. The point estimate listed for each country-year is the median of this distribution, which represents the most likely value for that country in that year. Accompanying the point estimate, V-Dem provides information on the 70 percent credible intervals of the point estimates.

Using these estimates of uncertainty, we code as an *erosion* any decline that is at least twice as large as the gap between the point estimate and the lower boundary of the credible interval at the time of transition. For example, the estimate for liberal democracy in Ecuador in 1980, the year V-Dem codes as the first of the current democratic regime, was 0.483. The estimated gap between this point and the lower boundary of the 70 percent credible interval is 0.06. Thus, if Ecuador scored 0.363 or lower in 2017 without experiencing a democratic breakdown, we coded it as a case of erosion. The 2017 liberal-democracy score for Ecuador is 0.359, slightly past our threshold and qualifying the country for this categorization. We assume that a change twice as large as the gap indicates that the quality of democracy changed substantially, and that erosion has occurred.

Our coding of *major democratic advances* mirrors the strategy to measure erosion. In cases of advance, countries must improve their liberal-democracy score by at least two times the difference between the point estimate and the upper boundary of the credible interval estimated by the V-Dem measurement model. In most cases, the difference between the

Appendix—Scott Mainwaring and Fernando Bizzarro, “The Fates of Third-Wave Democracies,” *Journal of Democracy* 30 (January 2019): 99–113.

median of the distribution and the lower and upper boundary is about 0.05 points on the 0 to 1 scale. Accordingly, it usually takes a decrease or increase of about 0.10 points from the first year of democracy to 2017 to qualify as an erosion or a major advance.

*Highly democratic without major advances:* Operationally, the V-Dem liberal-democracy score in these countries was at least 0.7 in 2016, and the initial score was just a minor variation around the 2017 value. We set the threshold at 0.7 because there it is where the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of the data is. Only 10 percent of observations in levels of liberal democracy for all countries, all years are higher than 0.7, meaning that this is an elevated level. We code small variations based on the same credible intervals listed above: the difference between the first year and 2017 must not be larger or smaller than the gap between the point estimate for the last year and its upper or lower boundary to its confidence interval (i.e., the case was not an advance or erosion).

We operationalize *stagnation* similarly to the way we coded highly democratic without major advances, except that countries have a level of liberal democracy in 2017 lower than 0.70. Every country whose 2017 level of democracy was lower than 0.70 and where the change over time was not larger or smaller than two times the gap between the initial point estimate and the upper or lower boundary of its credible interval is coded as a case of stagnation.

**Online Appendix 3:  
Outcomes measured the year before breakdown**

Country	Transition		Last year of democracy		Difference	Outcome
	Year	Score	Year	Score		
Armenia	1990	0.351	1995	0.295	-0.056	Stagnation
Bangladesh	1992	0.291	2005	0.258	-0.033	Stagnation
Belarus	1992	0.458	1995	0.387	-0.071	Stagnation
Burkina Faso	1993	0.273	2014	0.415	0.142	Advances
Comoros	2007	0.328	2014	0.420	0.092	Stagnation
Dominican Republic	1982	0.316	1989	0.284	-0.032	Stagnation
Fiji	1993	0.437	1999	0.462	0.025	Stagnation
Fiji	2002	0.450	2006	0.167	-0.283	Erosion
Ghana	1980	0.450	1980	0.450	.	NR*
Honduras	1990	0.266	2009	0.290	0.024	Stagnation
Macedonia	1998	0.417	2011	0.390	-0.027	Stagnation
Madagascar	1994	0.394	2000	0.310	-0.084	Stagnation
Malawi	1995	0.465	2003	0.418	-0.047	Stagnation
Maldives	2009	0.381	2013	0.286	-0.095	Stagnation
Mali	1993	0.472	2011	0.447	-0.025	Stagnation
Moldova	1992	0.374	2004	0.352	-0.022	Stagnation
Montenegro	2003	0.395	2006	0.386	-0.009	Stagnation
Nepal	2009	0.435	2011	0.447	0.012	Stagnation
Nicaragua	1990	0.371	2007	0.282	-0.089	Erosion
Niger	2000	0.417	2008	0.455	0.038	Stagnation
Peru	1981	0.467	1991	0.425	-0.042	Stagnation
Philippines	1988	0.423	2003	0.416	-0.007	Stagnation
Russia	1992	0.324	1999	0.317	-0.007	Stagnation
Serbia	2001	0.474	2016	0.337	-0.137	Erosion
Solomon Islands	1978	0.366	1998	0.372	0.006	Stagnation
Sri Lanka	1995	0.345	2004	0.343	-0.002	Stagnation
Suriname	1976	0.667	1979	0.673	0.006	Stagnation
Tanzania	1996	0.413	2000	0.406	-0.007	Stagnation
Tanzania	2006	0.432	2015	0.430	-0.002	Stagnation
Thailand	1997	0.367	2005	0.381	0.014	Stagnation
Turkey	1988	0.361	2013	0.335	-0.026	Stagnation
Ukraine	1994	0.385	1997	0.338	-0.047	Stagnation
Ukraine	2006	0.41	2013	0.311	-0.099	Erosion
Zambia	1994	0.384	2013	0.387	0.003	Stagnation

\* Not recorded. Regime only lasted for one year.

**Online Appendix 4: Data**

**Table 1A. Regression Results**

DV Model	Breakdown			Advances		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Democratic history	0.416 (0.357)	0.488 (0.364)	0.644 (0.401)	0.215 (0.424)	0.592 (0.491)	0.432 (0.511)
Regional % of Dem.	-1.918 (1.212)	-2.353* (1.320)	-2.182 (1.327)	0.555 (1.219)	1.941 (1.398)	1.808 (1.424)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.466 (0.315)		-0.547 (0.430)	0.878* (0.459)		1.116* (0.638)
State Capacity		-0.570 (0.378)	-0.169 (0.482)		0.609 (0.451)	-0.044 (0.552)
GDP growth	-0.136* (0.074)	-0.134* (0.076)	-0.142* (0.075)	0.341* (0.181)	0.224 (0.173)	0.296 (0.201)
Presidential	0.159 (0.344)	0.243 (0.357)	0.316 (0.367)	-0.088 (0.410)	-0.370 (0.446)	-0.396 (0.465)
Lib. Dem. 1y	-9.021*** (3.392)	-8.393** (3.260)	-7.992* (3.433)	-9.102*** (3.300)	-8.467** (3.449)	-10.336** (3.803)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.254	0.298	0.311	0.280	0.213	0.335
Observations	89	84	84	57	53	53

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

In this section we describe the variables included in Table 1A. The dependent variables of models 1 and 2 are a binary indicator that assumes the value of 1 when the democratic regime broke down. The dependent variables of models 3 and 4 are a binary indicator that assumes the value of 1 when there was democratic advancement between the year of transition and the final year of the democratic regime—which is 2017 for countries that have remained democratic. To code both democratic breakdowns and advancements, we took advantage of data from the V-Dem project and applied the rules discussed in Appendix 1.

As independent variables in the regressions in Table 1A, we included first the depth of a country’s previous democratic experiences (*Democratic experience*). We built this variable using

Appendix—Scott Mainwaring and Fernando Bizzarro, “The Fates of Third-Wave Democracies,” *Journal of Democracy* 30 (January 2019): 99–113.

data from V-Dem and based on the operationalization of regime types discussed in Appendix 1.

The *Democratic experience* of a country is the number of years in which that country was coded in a democracy in our dataset since 1900 minus the number of years in which it was coded as an autocracy.

We also included the share of democracies in each country’s region in the year in which that country transitioned to democracy and called this variable *Regional % of Democracies*. Again, we coded each country’s regimes using data from V-Dem and the rules discussed in Appendix 1. To define the region to which each country belonged, we took advantage of the Quality of Government Standard Dataset’s (2018) political-geographic division of world regions. It lists ten regions: 1: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (postcommunist countries; including Mongolia); 2: Latin America (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic); 3: The Middle East and North Africa/MENA (including Israel and Turkey); 4: Sub-Saharan Africa; 5: Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia, and New Zealand); 6: East Asia; 7: South-East Asia; 8: South Asia; 9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand; see 5); 10: The Caribbean (including Belize, Haiti, Guyana, and Suriname). The share is measured as the ratio of the number of democracies divided by the number of countries in the region, not counting the country of interest.

To measure GDP per capita, we used the data collected by the Maddison Project (2018). For the instances in which data from the Maddison project was not available, we collected data from the World Bank estimates of GDP per capita. Data from both sources are measured as constant 2011 international dollars. We include the level of GDP per capita in the year in which a country transitioned to democracy.

We also include measures of economic growth, using estimates of the yearly variation in GDP levels observed in the Maddison Project (2018) and the World Bank datasets (*GDP growth*). We estimate the average yearly growth rate between the year in which a country transitioned to democracy and the last year in which it was coded as democratic (the year before breakdown, or 2017 for countries that did not break down).

To measure *State capacity*, we use the estimates of state capacity introduced by Hanson and Sigman (2013). We thank the authors for sharing their dataset with us. We included the values for the year in which the country transitioned to democracy. These values are measured as standard deviations above and below the world mean.

To indicate whether the country is *Presidential* or not, we use data from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al. 2018).

Finally, we include a variable measuring the value of the liberal-democracy index from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018a, Pemstein et al. 2018) in the first year of the democratic regime.

Table 1B provides summary statistics of each independent variable included in the regression.

**Table 1B. Descriptive statistics, independent variables**

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Democratic experience	91	-65.4	34.8	-111	8
Regional % of Dem.	91	0.443	0.240	0.063	1.000
GDP per capita	89	5894.9	4934.1	669	27312
GDP growth	89	0.025	0.039	-0.130	0.119
State Capacity	85	-0.158	0.799	-2.377	1.620
Presidentialism	90	0.589	0.820	0	2